The paper offers an introduction and a road map to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets.
These results allow us to draft some policy indications for public (and private) tender designers. With respect to insiders, outsiders appear more generous (over-reward quality), shifting competition towards price more than what the buyer would desire ex-ante. Third, we find that the distribution of scores for technical proposals are less dispersed when evaluating committees include "outsiders" (non-IT persons). Quite surprisingly, price and quality appear negatively related. Second, we find no evidence of a tension between price and (ex-ante) quality in submitted tenders. The property of predictability of the scoring rule is worth the buyer 26%-33% of reduced price-quality ratios. In particular, experience is worth suppliers a 6% increase in the technical score for any additional awarded contract, and up to 8.6% improvement in the price- quality ratios. First, both the nature of the scoring rule and firms' past experience appear to influence submitted price-quality ratios, although the magnitude of the former is much stronger than the latter. We exploit a unique dataset of contracts awarded by the Italian Public Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.) on behalf of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance. In this paper we explore the determinants of suppliers' bidding behavior in public procurement competitive tendering for IT services.
Finally, in an open economy, achieving the globally optimal level of protection requires an international coordination (rather than the harmonization) of IPR protection. Thirdly, the optimal level of IPR protection should tradeoff the social benefits of enhanced innovation against the social costs of multiple distortions and income inequality. Secondly, there is empirical evidence supporting a positive relationship between IPR protection and innovation, but the evidence is stronger for developed countries than for developing countries. Firstly, different patent policy instruments have different effects on R&D and growth. In summary, this paper draws the following conclusions from the literature. Then, the second part considers the international aspects of IPR protection. This part also discusses the distortionary effects and distributional consequences of IPR protection as well as empirical evidence on the effects of patent rights. The first part of this paper introduces different patent policy instruments and reviews their effects on R&D and economic growth. This paper provides a survey on studies that analyze the macroeconomic effects of intellectual property rights (IPR).
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